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Abstract: Price signals have been suggested to bring about greater demand side flexibility and thus support the integration of
variable sources of energy, such as wind. A conflict exists between keeping these signals simple for consumers, while making
responses appropriate for increasingly complex supply–demand balancing dynamics in future. This study reviews some of the
demand responses observed in time-of-use (ToU) tariff trials and assesses their effectiveness in scenarios with higher levels of
wind. The authors simulate wholesale real-time prices for high-wind scenarios as a benchmark tariff. Simple tariff structures
are compared against real-time prices for the extent to which they can ‘nudge’ demand in the ‘right direction’. They present
results which suggest that even in high-wind scenarios, simple ToU tariffs could have a beneficial effect on overall system
costs. The load shifting and reduction behaviour observed under ToU trials could lower energy costs by between 4 and 6%
without the need for complex price signals.1 Introduction
The decarbonisation of our electricity systems brings with it
unprecedented challenges. In the short term, the UK and
other European countries face the closure of significant
parts of the present generation fleet in response to the Large
Combustion Plant Directive [1]. This is expected by some
to reduce capacity margins to potentially insecure levels [2].
In the medium term, the introduction of larger shares of
renewable energy could pose new challenges of providing
flexibility [3] and in the longer term, electrification of
heating and transport could put further strain on system
integration [4].
A more flexible demand side could help with all of the
above challenges [5, 6]. If incentivised appropriately,
demand could become more responsive to system needs. In
the first place, this could address peak demand concerns.
For the UK, peak demand periods are reasonably well
understood and tend to occur on winter weekdays about
5:30 pm. A simple time-of-use tariff (ToU), which charges
a premium for consumption during this period, could
potentially reduce peak demand and avoid supply shortages
and costly peak generating capacity. Such tariffs have been
trialled in Ireland and in the UK. Results show a reduction
in peak demand in some cases by between 8 and 10% [7, 8].
The introduction of large amounts of wind may complicate
the times at which demand should increase or decrease. The
simple and static ToU tariffs may no longer send the
appropriate signal and more dynamic tariffs may berequired. The gold standard in terms of neo-classical
economics would be to expose consumers to real-time
prices, as they are experienced in wholesale markets [9].
This would convey the ‘true’ cost of electricity to
consumers who could make a rational decision over
whether to use electricity depending on their own utility
value. Their ‘choice’ to use or forgo the use of electricity
would, according to this theory, lead to an economically
efficient allocation of supply and demand.
For fully automated appliances real-time responses are
mostly a technical issue. Fridges and other thermal loads
can conceivably be cycled in response to external signals,
such as price signals, without necessarily inconveniencing
their user [10]. A large part of energy uses have, however,
a very direct interaction between users and technology.
Practices and behaviour play an important role in the timing
and extent of this type of energy use. Influencing these
through price signals is arguably more challenging than
mere device automation [11].
And here lies a dilemma: more complex signals place a
higher burden on consumers, potentially deterring
engagement and increasing uncertainty over bills. Darby
and Pisica [12] compared the acceptability of different tariff
structures to consumers and found real-time prices were
seen as less acceptable than ToU tariffs while Dütschke and
Paetz [13] show that consumers are open to dynamic
pricing, but prefer simple programs to complex and highly
dynamic ones. Star et al. [14] further describe how
potential savings from real-time price schemes have not led1
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Fig. 1 ToU tariffs as used by The Commission for Energy
Regulation (CER) [7]
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to significant uptake among consumers in Illinois. Even with
mostly static flat tariffs, the energy regulator and consumer
groups have perceived UK tariffs as ‘too complex’,
preventing consumers from being able to make informed
choices [15].
How can the need for more complex signals be reconciled
with the consumers preference and need for simple messages?
In this paper, we simulate future price volatility to explore
whether price signals necessarily have to be complex and
what contribution in terms of system cost savings demand
response could offer under simple ToU tariffs.
The focus of this paper is on behavioural responses, rather
than automated or other technical solutions, such as storage.
Behavioural responses are seen as a contributor to system
balancing and are expected to operate alongside a range of
other measures. The modelling does therefore not assume
that demand has to respond substantially more during
extreme stress events. Rather, demand response would
make a small contribution in the ‘right direction’, thus
reducing the extent to which other measures are required,
without necessarily fully displacing them.
In Section 2, we set out how we compare ToU tariffs and
the responses observed in field trials, with real-time prices
derived from wholesale market simulations for high-wind
scenarios. The impact on consumer bills and the energy
system are reported in Section 3 and we explore the
possible shape of future ToU tariff profiles. Sections 4 and
5 draw out some of the implications for future tariff design
and point to limitations and need for further work in this area.Fig. 2 Comparison of demand profile for baseline and
corresponding test period for 108 consumers subjected to the ToU
tariff D
Based on [7] data2 Methodology
The model used here builds on work published by Grünewald
et al. [16]. To estimate the cost saving potential of demand
response to future systems, we expanded this model to
combine empirical data from ToU tariff trials with
wholesale price simulations for different future scenarios.
Although the tariff bands for ToU trials were not designed
with high levels of wind in mind, we explore the demand
response observed under these tariffs for their hypothetical
use with high levels of wind. Half-hourly settlement periods
are simulated, such that the impact of tariffs can be
assessed against the system requirements at the time. From
this, we seek to identify whether a demand response was
beneficial or indeed counter-productive.
It is important to note that future prices – and volatile prices
in particular – are difficult to predict and carry a significant
amount of uncertainty. Prices simulated here assume similar
market arrangements, dynamics and levels of competition to
the present market against which the model is calibrated.
However, even if the scale of the price volatility may differ,
this paper deliberately follows a simple method to
discriminate high-price and low-price periods, for which the
assumptions of this simulation are expected to be sufficient.2.1 Demand response in ToU tariff trials
The underlying dynamics of electricity use in households are
still poorly understood. An increasing body of evidence is
being built up through a range of studies, which attempt to
better understand the energy use in households (see [11])
and trials are growing in size and statistical validity [17–19].
Among the statistically most robust studies to date is the
trial of static ToU tariffs by the Commission for Energy
Regulation in Ireland [7]. Household loads for a total of2
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative C
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)over 5000 participants were recorded from 1 July 2009 until
31 December 2009 under conventional tariffs and again for
the following year, this time subjected to one of four ToU
tariffs and one control group, which remains on their
standard tariff. Average load reductions in response to ToU
tariffs on the order of 2.4% were observed and peak
demand reduction reached 8.8%. The tariffs are shown in
Fig. 1, but is was noted that the extent of the price increase
is less significant for response behaviour than the sheer
presence of differential pricing [7]. The tariff periods reflect
the characteristics of the typical load curve, which peaks
between 5 pm and 7 pm and has relatively low
consumption between 11 pm and 8 am. We focus this
analysis on a group of 108 households exposed to the
highest peak time prices (Tariff D). Fig. 2 shows the shift
in load profiles for this group between the period before the
trial on conventional tariffs (baseline), and once these
consumers were exposed to ToU tariffs. Both peak
reduction and a slight increase in night-time consumption
are apparent.
We further limit the analysis to the same time of year as
monitored during the baseline period, such that seasonal
effects can be minimised. The load profile before and after
introduction of the ToU tariff are shown in Fig. 2. The
reduction in peak load is clearly visible, as is the slight
increase in night time consumption. The overall reduction
in consumption for this group is about 3.8%.ommons Attribution
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Fig. 4 Average electricity market prices for 48 settlement periods
of the day, averaged over one year
Solid line: based on [23], dashed line: simulated
Table 1 Model parameters
Parameter Value Unit
wind capacity 5–30 GW
baseload capacity 20 GW
mid-merit capacity 30 GW
plant availability 95 %
ramp limit 750–1500 MW/h
α 1.5
κ 10
marginal cost wind 1 £/MWh
marginal cost baseload 8 £/MWh
marginal cost mid merit 24 £/MWh
marginal cost peaking 33 £/MWh
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2.2 Wholesale price formation
To estimate the wholesale market price of electricity, and thus
the ‘ideal’ real-time price, we assume a simple merit order
stack with four classes of generation: (i) uncontrollable
generation (e.g. wind) with low short-run marginal costs,
(ii) baseload generation (e.g. nuclear) with the technical
ability to ramp up and down, but little economic incentive
to do so, (iii) mid merit plants, which can load follow
within their ramping constraint and (iv) peaking plant
which deliver energy during peak demand and may support
fast ramping. The latter category has by definition lower
load factors and only remains viable to operate by being
able to realise wholesale prices well above its marginal
costs of generation.
The model seeks to meet demand through the lowest cost of
generation, while maintaining system stability and ensuring
that sufficient ‘responsive’ plant remains on the system. In
the absence of significant amounts of storage any surplus
generation from wind is assumed to be curtailed.
The wholesale prices are based on the short-run marginal
costs of generation of the marginal plant and the state of the
system at the time. So long as sufficient capacity is
available the wholesale price only rises linearly, such that
once a class of generation is fully deployed, the wholesale
price reaches the marginal cost of the next more expensive
generator, which enters the market at this point.
For peaking plants the situation is slightly different. Since
they are the ‘last resort’, prices tend to rise exponentially as
the available capacity reaches its limits. This effect is
known as the ‘price uplift’ and can be empirically observed
in the balancing market and has been theoretically analysed
and simulated by Green and Vasilakos [20] and was also
applied by Cox [21, 22] and others.
In this model, we simulate the price up lift as
U (t) = k× ea(L(t)/C(t)−L(t)) (1)
where U is the factor by which marginal costs are marked up.
L is the total system load and C is the generation capacity
available at the time to meet this load. κ and α are used to
calibrate the function to empirically observed market
behaviour.
The same approach is applied to curtailment events, where
bidding occurs in the opposite direction. The more generators
are requested ‘not to generate’ the higher the price for not
generating becomes, such that electricity prices can become
negative. Such curtailment events are becoming more
common. The empirical evidence for market price
developments under these conditions is, however, not yet
sufficient for calibration and we assume the sameFig. 3 Price duration curve for balancing market data for 2010
against simulated prices (dashed line)
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Fig. 3 compares the price duration curve for empirically
observed prices based on Great Britain market data [23] and
simulated results. The simulated results were further
validated for temporal accuracy against daily price
distributions as shown in Fig. 4.
The price profiles are a function of both total load and
ramping requirements. Assumption about the ability of
mid-merit plants to load follow has important ramifications
for the role of peaking plants and thus the price profiles. For
the present GB system a ramping constraint of 1500 MW per
hour produce a good match with observed results. However,
the flexibility of the system may change in future and we
will return to its implications. Further details about model
assumptions can be found in Table 1.
2.3 Other model inputs
The simulated prices are based on load profiles for the GB and
Ireland, wind profiles and a set of assumptions about future
system scenarios.
Half-hourly load profiles are available from National Grid
for GB [24] and from EirGrid for the Irish market [25]. The
default for this study is 2010 data to be consistent with the
Irish ToU trial data. For verification purposes, we have also
used GB demand data dating back to 2003.
The wind resource is based on an optimised portfolio of
wind turbines across GB. Wind speeds were obtained from
the British Atmospheric Data Centre’s MIDAS dataset for a
selection of 16 sites [26]. The conversion into a wind
energy resource is described in [16].3
icle published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution
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Fig. 6 Daily pattern of demand is still apparent after wind
generation has been subtracted
Based on one year half-hourly data with wind capacity of 50% of peak
demand. Thick lines indicate the highest and lowest gross demand for each
half-hour in this year.
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3 Results
3.1 ToU tariff responses in high-wind scenarios
Based on the wholesale price formation observed in current
markets we estimate the effect of higher penetration of
variable wind sources in future markets. The additional
wind resource displaces some mid-merit capacity, such that
peaking plant capacity is accommodating greater variations
in wind power. The load factor for some of these plants
reduces and wholesale prices during peak net-demand
(demand minus wind power) can increase substantially.
In the spirit of our real-time pricing assumptions, wholesale
prices have been converted directly to retail prices. Our model
suggests that prices would rise. However, the focus of our
analysis is to compare the shape, rather than the magnitude
of the price profiles. Thus, prices are normalised to an
average electricity price of 14.1 cents per kWh (the rate
used for the control group in the CER trial).
Fig. 5 shows the average price distribution for each
settlement period of the day. Compared to the current prices
in Fig. 4, two trends are apparent. Firstly, the spread
between high-price and low-price periods has become more
pronounced. Off peak prices are depressed as a result of the
low running costs of wind, while peak prices increased
because of the increased peak net-demand events being met
by peaking plants.
Of particular interest for this analysis is the overall shape
and timing of high-price and low-price events. These have
not shifted substantially, suggesting that even with wind
capacity of 50% of peak load (i.e. about 30 GW on a
system with 60 GW peak), the highest prices are still
closely related to demand levels. This persistence of
demand profiles is shown in Fig. 6. Owing to the stochastic
nature of wind profiles, the daily pattern of demand remains
apparent, even after the wind generation has been
subtracted. Both the morning ramp up and the afternoon
peak remain clearly visible, especially during winter
months, which correspond to the higher load days in this
graph.
The profile shape is also related to the degree of flexibility
that was necessary to operate the system with more wind.
Mid-merit plant are displaced by peaking plant, which
responds to changes in wind levels. In this case, demand
response would not be needed to balance the system
continuously in response to wind and the primary trigger
remains peak load. The simple ToU tariffs, which are
tailored to these periods may therefore remain appropriate.
It is worth noting, however, that the above system
flexibility comes at a cost. Mid-merit plants are cheaper toFig. 5 Price profile for one year with wind capacity of 50% of peak
demand
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less flexible system, which has less capacity to respond to
changes in wind, suggests that price rises can occur at any
time of day. Even during low demand periods costly
spinning reserve may need to operate to ensure system
stability. A less flexible system may thus demand more
flexibility at less predictable intervals from the demand side.
These results indicate that ToU tariffs may remain relevant
even in high-wind scenarios, provided other forms of
flexibility are present as well. In the following section, we
will take a closer look at how different pricing structures
would affect consumers and how the demand responses
observed in the CER trial may align with future system needs.
3.2 ToU demand response and real-time pricing
The demand data in the CER trial provides a baseline
measurement, which was taken during the 171 days
preceding the trial when households were still on flat tariffs,
and the comparison profile when these households were
subjected to the ToU tariffs. We now use these data to
explore hypothetical billing situations and the effect
different tariffs would have on household bills and in turn,
how much the observed ToU response would help in
reducing these bills. To this end, we multiply the demand
of each customer in each half-hour period with the RTP
simulated by the model for this period. The total is
aggregated for the period July to December prior to the
participants being subjected to the ToU tariffs (baseline)
and again for the same period after they operated under
ToU tariffs (shifted demand). The comparison between
these two periods allows us to estimate whether the load
shift would have led to a reduction in bills.
The reduction in bills is used here as a proxy, not so much
for household savings, but for potential system savings:
real-time prices are the result of a least cost allocation of
generation, so a lower bill under real-time prices implies
that the cost of provision could be reduced under this load
shifted behaviour. The marginal cost on which our
simulated prices are based, reflect the cost that would be
incurred for additional load, or the avoided cost when loadommons Attribution
IET Renew. Power Gener., pp. 1–8
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Fig. 7 Simulated price profile for one year with wind capacity of
5% of peak demand
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is reduced at this point in time. They therefore present a proxy
for generation cost changes. In addition, operational savings
may result (such as avoided spinning reserve) as well as
network savings from deferred or avoided reinforcements.
These are not captured by this model and savings therefore
constitute a lower bound of possible system benefits.
Table 2 shows the effect on household bills resulting from
different tariff structures for the 108 households on tariff D in
the CER trial. During the baseline period, when households
were still on flat tariffs, an average electricity bill for the
July to December period would amount to about 291 Euros.
Even though the ToU tariffs were constructed to have the
same average cost to consumers, a higher share of
consumption occurs during the high-tariff periods, resulting
in slightly higher bills if the same load profiles had been
billed with dynamic tariffs. The same effect is responsible
for the higher bills in the case of RTPs. Since the overall
cost of provision has not changed, one could argue that the
tariffs should be set lower, such that the average cost is
below 14.1 cent per kWh and the billed amount remains the
same. The CER trial ensured that participants would not
suffer higher bills by compensating them for any increase
through a direct repayment.
The right column in Table 2 shows the reduction in
electricity bills as a consequence of load reduction and load
shifting as performed in response to tariff D. As one would
expect, bills are reduced when ToU tariff D is applied,
relative to the cost that the original demand profile would
have incurred, since this is the price signal the occupants
did respond to. Interestingly, however, bills are also reduced
had they been calculated based on real-time tariffs. This is
to say that the response provided was beneficial under RTP
considerations, without the households in this study even
being aware of the signals this tariff would have sent them.
For both, the Irish and the UK example the benefit
increases with higher levels of wind on the system. This is
significant, because it suggests that the response that was
triggered by the ToU remains valuable and may even
increase in value over time.
The rationale for RTP is to reflect the true cost of
electricity. If the ToU response leads to lower bills under
assumed RTP billing, then we can conjecture that the costs
of provision would have been reduced also.
Thus the ToU tariff has had a positive impact on system
costs, even and especially in high-wind scenarios. What
these results do not tell us is whether and how much more
households may have saved if their response had indeed
been informed by real-time prices. It is safe to assume that
for some households greater savings are possible and
empirical work on price responses will help to better
understand this additional potential.Table 2 Demand shift exercised by households responding to
tariff D, would lower bills, even if these had been calculated
based on RTP tariffs
Tariff Bill [Euro],
baseline demand
Saving [Euro (%)], from
shifted demand
ToU (D) 318 18 (5.6)
RTP IE (5% wind) 314 15 (4.7)
RTP IE (50% wind) 414 24 (5.8)
RTP UK (5% wind) 326 12 (3.7)
RTP UK (50%wind) 372 15 (4.1)
Period July–December using Irish (IE) and UK wind resources
IET Renew. Power Gener., pp. 1–8
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The tariff bands shown in Fig. 1 were designed to suit present
load profiles and supply challenges. We will now explore how
such a simple tariff may be derived from future real-time
prices.
Figs. 5–9 show real-time profiles (red lines) averaged over
given periods for low and high-wind scenarios. For
consistency with the available baseline data from [7] study
we focus on the period July to December and single out
December separately as a month commonly experiencing
peak demand events.
Two periods of above average prices are apparent from the
real-time price profiles. One during the morning hours, which
is a result of ramping constraints, which were simulated as
1500 MW per hour for the relevant mid-merit plants.
Greater deployment of fast ramping plants could reduce the
price rises during the morning ramp up, but could drive up
overall operating costs. The second peak in the late
afternoon is more related to capacity constraints. This
becomes especially apparent in Figs. 8 and 9, which show
price curves for December only. Here national demand
reaches its highest level about 5:30 pm with the
corresponding peaks in prices are most pronounced around
that time.
The simulation of higher levels of wind power on the
system, assumed to be 50% of national peak load in Figs. 5
and 9, increases the spread between high-price and
low-price periods [This effect has been somewhat tamed
through the normalisation of the tariffs to an average price
of 14.1 cent]. It is noteworthy, however, that the timing of
high prices have not changed fundamentally with respect to
the low-wind cases in Figs. 7 and 8. This supports the
observation that consumer signals, which are presently
informed by demand profiles and seek to reduce peak
demand, could remain valid in high-wind futures.Fig. 8 Simulated price profile for December wind capacity of 5%
of peak demand
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Fig. 9 Price profile for December with wind capacity of 50% of
peak demand
www.ietdl.orgThe main change that can be observed from these
simulations between low and high-wind scenarios is that the
off peak price reduces significantly with higher levels of
wind, thereby potentially sending a stronger signal to ‘shift’
demand to off-peak periods.Fig. 10 RMS error between selected tariff types and a real-time
price for a scenario with wind capacity at 50% of peak demand
Data represents six years of wind profiles and demand profiles for 2010
Dots mark the median error, whiskers indicate the outer quartiles
Fig. 11 False ToU signals from the binary tariff in Fig. 9
Demand reduction outside high-price periods would have been beneficial in
3.3% of settlement periods, especially in winter, while higher day time prices
can send a false signal 20% of the time, predominantly in summer3.4 Approximating RTP with ToU
Real-time prices are the ‘gold standard’ from a neo-classical
economics standpoint. Subjecting consumers to such prices
relates the ‘true’ cost of provision to them and is said to
allow them to make appropriate choices. In practice,
however, people may have other things to do in their life
than monitor and evaluate the electricity prices, plan future
consumption and adjust their behaviour in real-time. A
compromise may therefore need to be reached between the
accuracy of the price signal and the simplicity of the
message passed on to the energy user.
We do not have experimental data to suggest what the
demand response by consumers might be under the
real-time prices shown in Figs. 5–9. For the purposes of
this paper, however, we continue to follow the premise that
consumers would prefer and would be more likely to
engage with simple tariffs and price signals. The simplest
price signal is binary: a high price to suggest using less
electricity and a low price when consumption is less critical
(or a higher load would indeed be beneficial from a system
stability standpoint). The daily RTP profile is translated into
ToU bands by dividing each settlement period into either
being below or above the mean price. Each half-hour period
above the mean is assigned the mean price of all periods
above the mean and conversely for all periods below the
mean, leading to a binary price signal. Figs. 5–9 show what
the binary ToU price signal equivalent to the real-time
prices would look like (black lines).
While such simplified price signals might offer benefits to
consumers, their accuracy with respect to real-time prices
remains a concern. Fig. 10 shows the error between
different levels of tariff complexity and the ‘gold standard’
RTP. The errors are recorded as the root-mean-square
difference between the tariff and the RTP for each half-hour
period in each month. Owing to the increased price
volatility in a scenario with wind installations equivalent to
50% of peak demand, the flat tariff can lead to substantial
discrepancies with the real-time price, which are reduced
through the adoption of ToU tariffs.
A static ToU tariff (middle graph), which is based on the
simple binary price signal and applied across the year, leads
to a reduction in error. However, winter months remain
problematic.6
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative C
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that are specific to each month. These still adhere to the
simple binary principle of one high-price and one low-price
level. Month specific ToUs reduce winter errors to levels
broadly below those experienced during the summer
months with a flat tariff.
As Figs. 7–9 illustrate, the binary tariff levels are a crude
approximation of real-time price profiles. Yet, as Fig. 10
illustrates, they can substantially reduce the error and
therefore improve on the signal sent to consumers.
Fig. 11 shows the distribution of false price signals over
one year. In this illustration ‘false negatives’ are low price
periods when a demand reduction would have been
desirable from a system perspective, while ‘false positives’
are periods when the price was high, yet demand reduction
was not necessarily required from the system. These periods
indicate when a simplified ToU price signal might produce
demand response behaviour that would be
counterproductive from a system balancing perspective.
False negatives are lower in number (3.3% of the half-hour
periods), however, these are the periods when wholesaleommons Attribution
IET Renew. Power Gener., pp. 1–8
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prices can reach very high levels. The seasonality of the need
for demand response is evident from both Figs. 10 and 11.
Especially in winter months errors can be large, with
December and January displaying the highest median errors.4 Discussion
The trade-off between accurate price signals and the
simplicity of the message sent to consumers is complex.
We have begun to review the price accuracy aspect. For a
better understanding of the impact of different messages
and signals to consumers on the effectiveness of their
response, detailed and extensive field trials are necessary.
We hypothesise, based on preliminary work in this area,
that energy users prefer simple messages and may be able
to respond to consistent messages by adjusting and
developing new practices and habits of energy use.
This analysis has shown that binary price signals, sending a
message as simple as ‘use less during these periods’ and ‘shift
load to those periods’, can have a positive impact even in
high-wind scenarios.
Despite higher levels of wind, the critical periods remain
largely around morning and late afternoon peak loads.
Provided other means of system balancing are available,
residential demand response can make a positive
contribution towards system balancing, even when
following such relatively simple messages. These data used
in this study constitute one of the best sources of household
load profiles to date. With the arrival of new energy use
practices, such as electric heating or electric vehicles, and
changes to use patterns, the load shape may change and the
level and shape of ToU tariffs would need to be adapted
accordingly.
The simulation further suggests that the critical months
remain to be winter months and particular attention needs to
be given to the messages sent out during these months. On
the one hand, it could be argued that price signals should
be limited to these critical months, thereby focusing
attention to the most valuable responses. Tariffs could be
structured to charge a flat rates for the majority of the year
and switch to ToU for the winter months, alerting
customers to the particular sensitivity of electricity
provision then.
Conversely, even if the need for ToU responses is less
during the summer months, a consistent tariff throughout
the year may help in establishing standard routines and
influence appliance purchasing decisions which involve
lower consumption during peak hours. Practices may adjust
such that dishwashers and washing machines are routinely
run outside peak hours, for example.
Aside from reduced cognitive demands on consumers, ToU
tariffs are easier to implement technically. No two way
real-time communication between the grid and ‘smart
meters’ is required. Dual-rate meters, as have been in use
for decades, especially in combination with night storage
heaters, would suffice for this task.
Tariffs which are designed to encourage reductions in
demand during peak hours are by definition punitive to
high consumption during these periods. From a system
perspective, one would want to entice households with
presently high peak time consumption onto these tariffs,
since these might have most load reduction to offer.
However, these households would perceive such tariffs as
more expensive and might favour flat rate alternatives, soIET Renew. Power Gener., pp. 1–8
doi: 10.1049/iet-rpg.2014.0031 This is an open access artlong as these are available. Some level of regulation may
therefore be required to complement such market-based tools.
Although we have shown that ToU tariffs remain to be a
useful tool for demand response stimulation with a view to
reduce overall system costs, other tariffs may deliver better
results. The trade-off between those gains and their impact
on consumers deserves detailed attention and further study.5 Conclusions
We have explored the extent to which relatively simple ToU
tariffs provide appropriate signals to consumers to respond to
future electricity system requirements. The analysis was
motivated by the suggestion that simple tariff structures and
messages could be more effective in engaging consumers to
adjust their demand patterns, but that such signals would
become increasingly inappropriate as more wind is added to
the system.
The simulation of real-time prices in scenarios with high
levels of wind has, however, shown that peak demand
periods could remain to be critical periods in future
systems. Even though wind output is stochastically
distributed and not strongly correlated to demand, the most
pressing demand response periods continue to be related to
high and low demand. Put simply, never is the need for
downward response greater than when low wind coincided
with high demand, and conversely, the greatest upward shift
in demand is needed during low demand periods meet high
wind output. Even simple ToU tariffs may therefore have a
beneficial impact in such systems and the value of their
contribution could rise over time. For the cases simulated
here, a ToU tariff may reduce costs by 4.1% in the UK and
5.8% in Ireland.
The shape of a desirable tariff profile may change slightly
for high-wind scenarios. Depending on the flexibility of the
overall system, prices could become more volatile with high
prices throughout the day, but especially during afternoon
peaks (5–7 pm). On the other hand, night time consumption
may need to be encouraged through further reductions in
prices, which in some scenarios could result in near zero
electricity price bands.
Simple messages to consumers are potentially more
effective at changing behaviour, practices and patterns of
electricity use, and thereby make a beneficial contribution
to future energy systems. However, these measures rely on
other forms of flexibility provision, such as automated
demand response, storage and flexible generation, which
could be more amenable to rapidly changing real-time prices.
Consumer studies suggest that simple tariff structures are
preferred by consumers. This paper hypothesises that
behaviour-based demand patterns may be more effectively
shaped by simple tariff signals. Further research and trials
into the response dynamics for different tariff types would
be important to test this hypothesis and to explore whether
inaccuracies of simpler tariffs are offset by better customer
engagement. In this context, it might be valuable to explore
the role simple tariffs could play in consumer learning,
which could facilitate the transition from simple to more
complex tariffs over time and deliver greater demand
flexibility than might be available in the early trials used
here. Furthermore, the assessment of marginal cost of
generation performed here, could be enhanced by directly
modelling the system costs and explicitly estimating savings
associated with system operation, generation capacity
requirements and network infrastructure.7
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